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SAB News

Insights: SAB Members' responses to Biodefense Bonus Question
Posted 10/16/2006

In the recent SAB Biodefense study, respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the following question:

Biodefense research funding is a boondoggle that is draining resources from the following critical biomedical research areas:

-causes, diagnosis, prevention, and cure of human diseases;
-processes of human growth and development;
-biological effects of environmental contaminants; and
-understanding of mental, addictive and physical disorders.


As usual, we received a number of wonderful responses that range from complete agreement, to absolute dissent, as well as everything in between. We have selected a substantial sample of thoughtful comments, and present them below.  




Agree -- neglecting other more important areas.

Agree to some extent. Much of the areas funded under the biodefense umbrella are only peripherally applicable and/or of poor quality.

Agree, HIV and TB are greater public health concerns.

Agree, simply because of the critical importance of biodefense to our nation's health at current time.

Agree, we need to spend our defense budget on more urgent needs inflation, jobs and education.

Agree. Although I believe that biodefense research is important. I believe it has taken valuable resources away from other research priorities which are just as important.

Agree. Causes, diagnosis, prevention, and cure of human diseases; processes of human growth and development;

Agree. It is draining resources; however, there is a high potential that "earmarked" funds could be better used on significant disease problems.

Agree. It is much more critical that the primary research emphasis is placed on treating and preventing existing diseases/conditions such as HIV and cancer that claim more human lives. Money placed on biodefense may prove to be a waste of resources in the long run when accounting for the civilian population.

Agree. Many of the potentially harmful agents cannot cause world-wide epidemics and can be stopped by simple preventive procedures. Thus, there is no need to spend so much money and drain resources from really important biomedical research.

Agree. Money tends not to end up in the hands of real researchers but is stolen by "beltway bandits". True biodefense research funding could be best utilized by studying concepts which could also be applied to public health, say real-time detection of viral agents, and hospital informatics as opposed to spending millions to write a report which says more needs to be done to protect our crops from nerve agents etc.

Agree. Most labs leveraging biodefense funding have redirected their research priorities simply to take advantage of readily available funds. Risk/benefit analysis of a biodefense threat vs. other research topics listed above does not warrant this huge expense yet that is the current situation in funding and scientists have responded accordingly.

Agree. Such research is not carefully prioritized and detracts funds from basic research that in the long-term will have greater knowledge value, overall.

Agree. The threat is not as real a public health danger as opioid addiction or stroke, for instance.

Agree. Too much is spent for such a minor threat. Many more people are becoming infected and dying each day form non-biodefense causes, his needs our maximal support.

Agree. We are much more likely to be adversely affected by these areas than by bioterrorism. The current government is using fear tactics to promote its agenda. Most people are more concerned about immediate health issues.

Although biodefense research is necessary in this world climate, it is a boondoggle. Many basic and applied scientists in microbiology, virology and immunology are studying defense against pathogens and their toxins as a means to ensure host survival. Instead of earmarking massive amounts of monies under the title of biodefense, it would be much better to invite current scientists to expand on their already established models and research. Thus, the best of both worlds would be obtained. Monies earmarked specifically for biodefense leads to the hemorrhage of funds from established NIH institutes and this leads to a reduction in the available funding pool for both competitive renewals and for new PI submissions on exciting and interesting projects that are somewhat more risky. Many a career of bright new scientists that would bring in new blood and ideas will be lost.

Biodefense research is important, but the NIH program has prioritized its threat agents without regard to the actual threat they pose. For instance, Ebola is a highly improbable biothreat but a major focus of the NIAID program. A committee from outside the NIH is needed to realistically prioritize pathogens and eliminate the "pet rock"-based list that prevails. The Army has spent years on prioritizing threat agents, but there is little evidence that the NIH has learned from their experience.

I absolutely agree, considering the large number of deaths caused by non biodefense causes.

I absolutely disagree! Many of the currently-funded basic science can also be funded through biodefense funding mechanisms. Additionally, scientists have a duty to provide science that is in the public's best interest. Sometimes it is not evident what is in the public's best-interest, but in the case of biodefense it is quite clear.

I agree and disagree. I see may researches clamoring for biodefense funds, getting them, and then just adding an extra lane on the gels they used to run. They are running away with the money and I can say for a fact they are not giving anything back in return. The government labs are suffering as a result. Give more money to NIAID and let NIAID do the research instead of waste it on researchers looking for a way to fund their favorite kinase research.


I agree because risk assessment indicates the that actual bio attacks are unlikely to be launched or to be successful. Research in this area seems poorly focused. I am moving out of this research area.

I agree because the primary funding source is the government which tends to supply funds in the usual "reactive" stance.

I agree strongly. The NCI budget decreased this year for the first time since the "'war on cancer" was declared. Many professional colleagues are leaving science due to lack of funding opportunities.

I agree that Biodefense is draining resources away from other critical research. However, NIH funding has barely kept up with inflation for the past 5 years while we throw away Billions on ridiculous projects like the "star wars" missile defense system. I would not blame Biodefense for pulling money away from important life-science research - rather I blame our Government for not spending more money on BOTH biodefense and critical life science research.

I agree that too much emphasis is being placed on biodefense at the expense of other areas. There is little evidence that biological agents are being developed against us. More people die from E. coli O157:H7 infections than from anthrax, etc. We are not living in reality and letting the hysteria direct our funding.

I agree to a point - there is too much money being thrown into a limited number of large centers of biodefense research that do not have the an adequate number of researchers who have extensive experience in working on biodefense agents.

I agree with that statement in that money is being drained from other priority areas. However, biodefense research is also enabling research into antimicrobial targets.

I agree with the statement - it would be so easy to make, move, and plant biological weapons that there isn't much that our current research can do to prevent or ameliorate it. This is a political and human problem, not so much a scientific on. It's a total boondoggle.

I agree with the statement because the red tape that we must go through can delay shipments as well as deliveries by as much as 2 months. This delay slows down the research and forces us to miss our goals. The fact that the federal government doesn’t support stem-cell research and other life-saving scientific breakthroughs due to either personal agendas or ethical debates saddens me. We are on the verge of developing cures for diseases that have plagued us as long as man has existed on this planet. A simple funding approval will help the scientific research community and the planet as a whole. When will the politicians that run this country stop their babbling and come to realize that there is hope for people with so-called incurable diseases? If they provide the scientific community with the funding and the ability to perform the critical research necessary, our planet would be a much better place to live.

I agree with this statement. There is been a huge shift in funds to this area of research, which has resulted in decrease levels of funding in all other areas. The large shift in funds often is a waste of money because it results in funding many investigators with no background in a given area of research. In the end, many will not pursue these research directions long-term. Thus, this type of funding process makes labs chase funding areas, rather than doing research in the fields that they have the most expertise. The result is not economically efficient and in the end hurts the research enterprise.

I agree with this to a certain extent. The success rate for funding for important basic research is at a very low point. It is discouraging to both beginning investigators and to more senior scientists who have to reapply several times in order to get funding. Many of our scientific breakthroughs have come from non-targeted basic research. That in my opinion should always remain the highest priority.

I agree with this to a considerable extent. Biodefense efforts invest inordinate amounts of money into the study of pathogens such as smallpox and anthrax - which are relevant only if there is a bioterrorism event. In light of the extensive biowarfare research conducted by the US in the 1970s (including that done on weaponized anthrax) puts our knowledge way ahead of anybody attempting the same right now. It would be better to re-direct efforts towards understanding the broad principles of host-pathogen interactions which could be applied towards ALL infectious diseases.

I agree, biodefense is taking away resources to study other aspects of human health research.

I agree, but this is usually true when the granting of research funds is in the hands of non-scientists (or ex-scientists). We have to follow the money in order to do any science at all. For instance, research into species preservation exhibits funding leaning towards "designer species" such as pandas, lions and such, because they present an inviting face to the public. In the same way, fear-mongering has shifted funding away from basic research to a more targeted research, even though the overall efficacy will likely suffer.

I agree. NIH funding is being cut in all of these areas but biodefense and DOD spending is through the roof. I wonder if our priorities are in order.

I agree. Research in biodefense is directly applicable to other areas of science.

I agree. The greatest contributors to diseases and healthcare dollars spent are directly related to obesity. It is not a respecter of country or discretionary income. A better understanding of how nutrition contributes to or initiates pathological processes would help those from emerging economies to large scale economies.

I agree. To me, the reaction is determined by the human's mind, not by research.
I agree; particularly with the efforts to generate vaccines - with recombinant DNA, years of vaccine development can be effectively rendered ineffective by generation of "new" pathogens.

I agree; some parts of the DoD/homeland Security are developing the same PCR and other assays over and over. Everyone seems to want to protect their own turf rather than collaborating on the same problems.

I agree since most of the best established lab are loosing federal funding and only lab doing Biodefense Research are well funded and without any economical stress.

I couldn't agree more! Information learned from basic research could help not only disease research, but it could help understand biodefense too. And now, because research monies are so hard to find, we're all having to change the focus of our research away from disease-related issues (that affect so many more people than bioterror!), to something that could actually be funded right now - anything to do with bioterrorism, or the prevention of.

I do agree with the statement. Besides draining resources from the those critical high impact research areas, the developments for biodefense may become a weapon that powerful nations (the ones that have the money for this kind of research) may use over other nations, usually poorer.

I do agree with this statement- although I personally benefit from this boondoggle. The money spent on development of vaccines for which there are already effective products or for which the potential customer/recipient base is small does not make sense. Anthrax is a prime example- how many of these vaccines do we need? Wouldn't it be better to develop a good bird flu vaccine? How about cancer prevention? Depression? Those are REAL problems, not a remote chance of mass anthrax exposure.

I do agree. See: Biological Weapon: A Terrible Reality? Profound Delusion? Skillful Swindling? by Sergey N. Rumyantsev Vantage Press, 2006

I feel that our government is too quick to dump money into an area that is "hot" on the radar of the US public. They should change this practice and think about things more before allocating money.

I generally agree with the statement, but also think the change is necessary and important.

I would agree with those statement because it is part of those research areas or maybe overlapped with them.

In some ways I agree. What needs to happen is that moneys targeted for biodefense specific funding should integrate with the other areas of funding. For example, research in human growth and development is important in biodefense if moneys were targeted to decreasing disease susceptibility by improving growth and development.

It is clear that in an arena where funding rates are dropping, money ear-marked for biodefense detracts from existing basic and applied research. This is clearly problematic.
It’s true to a large extent and I agree with it. (Specially given the fact that it is more of a "secondary response" to what someone else may want to do. And if its scientists at one place versus another, "the creators or bio-terrorism" definitely have a stronger advantage as they have a more defined goal in mind; unlike the "defense based strategy". So I think that research which can lead to accomplishing both Our regular goals (as listed above) and at the same time be used for bio-terrorism defense should be preferred. After all SARS was also a BIG bioterror not related to "terrorism".

The example I like to use is that B. anthracis killed 5 people in 2001, where influenza kills tens of thousands around the world every year. Nobody freaks out about the flu, but use the word anthrax and people are wearing masks and bleaching their mail.
The increased diversion of funds away from general medical research into the field of biodefense has had a chilling effect on research into cancer and other diseases not easily weaponized. By focusing our energies on diseases that "might" happen, we are causing the death toll to rise by not taking care of the very real and "present" causes of disease today. This type of research shift is very similar to the big pharma's act of cutting R&D. By providing a short term boost to the bottom line, they are causing long term harm to the organization as a whole.

Totally agree with the statement. Although the overall biomedical research funding is increased (what general public know) but lots of non-biodefense research areas funding are reduced (what we know and suffered). 100 senators signed to support cancer research before the approval of the 2005-6 fiscal year federal budget...the outcome is NCI got cut in the budget. Unless you are involved or able to carry out biodefense research. The funding situation is worse than before.

While it is important to protect our people from extremely dangerous threats, I think biodefense research is disproportionably over-funded. "Minor" threats exist every day in our country, and the most vulnerable among us are the target of non-thoughtful, uncompassionate decisions in health care. As a compromise, one of the areas that the biodefense program can support is the biological effects of environmental contaminates, because attacks to the environment could and would affect human health.

Yes - because non-category A diseases cause much more morbidity and mortality each year and we are investing huge amounts of money into diseases which, on average, affect zero people per year world-wide (ie, anthrax). We need a balance.

Yes it is. Because funding is insufficiently peer reviewed and given as large grants for projects of little scientific merit.

Yes the grant funding is going down each year.

Yes, but only temporarily.

Yes, I agree too many reasons to state.

Yes, I agree. I think funding should go towards general research on fighting infectious disease, rather than being targeted towards a set of guesses (select agents) that may or may not ever be genuine threats.

Yes, to an extent. I think research priorities are often best set by investigators. Funding prioritization can influence that, but the risk over many of these agents is low.

Yes. As currently administered, biodefense research funding is supporting projects of absolutely zero relevance to national security and nearly zero relevance to science and health (e.g., pointless, redundant, me-too studies of basic physiology and genetics of prioritized bacterial pathogens) and is failing to support projects of high relevance to national security and very high relevance to science and health (e.g., development of broad-spectrum antibacterial therapeutics).

Yes. Current structure of research in NIH emphasizes a few diseases that are politically sexy but post no real risk to society. This drains the resource for the research on diseases that really affect millions of people, such as TB, flu, etc.

Yes. From causes, diagnosis, prevention, and cure of human diseases. Solve the problem at hand rather than finding a solution for an anticipated problem.

Yes. We currently have an aging baby-boomer population that will require significant research resources to deal with their emerging chronic disease conditions, including heart disease, diabetes and neurological disorders. Redirecting substantial resources to biodefense ignores this ticking health timebomb and places an unfair burden on the next generation of tax payers.

Absolutely not! We currently experience annual infections and diseases caused by the majority of the select agents, save smallpox. We have seen one of the largest number of cases of plaque in decades, this without a biological attack. Each of these pathogens are naturally in the environment around the world and education is becoming globalized in part through the internet. It would not take a highly trained radical individual, regardless of ethnicity or religion, to infect oneself with a highly contagious pathogen then walk into a crowd and infect hundreds to thousands. The events of 9/11 and each of the TOPOFF exercises demonstrate how easy it is for the US to be caught looking. We have waited too long for proper alternative treatments and vaccines for the worlds most deadly diseases because we do not see epidemics occurring. Much of the research and funding avenues generated are only done in response to events, not in forethought. In the case of bacterial agents we have relied too heavily on antibiotics and we will eventually see resistance rise in these select agents, as now seen with TB and yersinia pestis, without any alternatives. Now, I will admit that we may not implement in the next 12 months the information gathered from current research due to a lack of an attack or threat. This should not be an excuse to ignore the looming problem. Furthermore, data collected from labs such as ours will not only benefit biodefense initiatives; but also provide insight into and animal models for sepsis (one of the top 10 killers) and septic shock (50%-80% mortality) pathogenesis and treatment. NOT ALL biodefense projects are vaccine development and NOT ALL biodefense projects are strictly a benefit to biodefense. With that said, we should raise funding in all fields of biomedical research and less on unsustainable and disadvantageous, but politically beneficial luxuries.

All basic research is valuable.

Application of the new tools and techniques of molecular biology (including bioIT) to the questions of biodefense are the best path to understanding human health. Subtle variations of molecular physiology are often only visible under dramatic perturbation, such as pathogenic infection. The knowledge gained in this are will lead to rapid advances in the other areas mentioned.

Biodefense funding would not drain resources from critical areas of biomedical research because the knowledge gained from biodefense projects could be used for the diagnosis and cure of human diseases, human growth and development, solving problems related to biological effects of environmental contaminants and understanding the molecular and cellular mechanisms of mental, addictive and physical disorders.

Biodefense has too much cross over in traditional medial sciences to be a wasteful endeavor. The DoD and others are pouring resources and funding into infectious disease research as well as supporting basic research in the life sciences at unprecedented amounts. This could have the beneficial effect of enhancing funding in those areas NIH wants to focus on. If the DoD is funding infectious disease and diagnostics research then the NIH should take advantage of it and focus on the other areas of importance to NIH.
Biodefense research funding is not only critical for national security but also can lead to major discoveries in our understanding of human diseases, development, environmental contamination and mental disorders.

Biodefense research is not another boondoggle draining resources from those other areas of vital research. The best scientists are versatile and creative and couch their research in terms of whatever the public wishes to fund. The problem has come from the administrative process of judging and distributing biodefense grants. The NIH has had to evaluate many more proposals and has relied on a few seasoned advisors, but many unseasoned (or from non-research backgrounds) and has tried to eliminate some of its task by lumping funding into large initiatives such as Research Centers for Excellence in Biodefense or (RCE's) that are administrative nightmare's. The situation for the individual investigator is a bitter one, money everywhere but none for the individual investigator who is not a favored member of intramural NIH, CDC, military research unit or an academic RCE unit. I belong to an RCE, but I receive about $20,000 a year from that. I have put in 10 R01 grants in the last 2 years and received NONE of them. The funding situation is desperate. I collaborate with some well-funded people in the military and in other big programs and the situation is dire. 90% of my work is putting in applications, and very little of my time is spent in productive research. The government needs to shift its funding from intramural programs and BIG academic programs to investigator initiated research.

Biodefense research, like most applied research to human disease or affliction, will yield broadly applicable knowledge to other conditions. Viral and bacterial infection is a reality of our everyday lives and advances made in the biodefense arena will likely spill over to basic infectious disease research. Highly specific detection technologies will immediately be applied to cancer, acute care diagnostics and biotech research.

Careful research could have applications to many diverse fields including disease diagnosis and biodefense, etc.

Clearly we need to spend money on biodefense. We cannot afford to be ill prepared in the event of a biological attack. This is a real threat to our national security.

Completely disagree - we are still contributing to basic knowledge of these pathogens, which do occur naturally. E.coli O157:H7 is one of the organisms in our database. Read the newspaper lately? Over 130 people affected in the latest outbreak, and one death.

Critical areas such as those are indeed important, however, the funding in biodefense has enabled some of the dollars allocated into fundamental bioanalytical research. This is a good thing for two reasons. First, it funds labs whose research is perhaps less medically inclined. This enables folks who are not used to the NIH levels of funding, such as physics and chemistry researchers, to get a piece of the pie. NIH gets a disproportionate amount of funding, and prices for biomedical "stuff" is correspondingly over inflated. Bringing in new viewpoints can often lead to a finding a better solution. Second, the expanded funding helps spur advances in analytical instrumentation. It is a law of science that advances follow after advances in instrumentation. Witness the consequences of the microscope, the telescope, or shotgun sequencing. Often these subsequent advances in the body of scientific knowledge come in areas vastly different from those for which a specific instrument was designed. In the present case, it is clear that advancing biodefense will readily translate into new tools for biomedical and environmental detection and monitoring.

Disagree- biodefense funding (properly done) advances progress against other infectious diseases.

Disagree to the extent that basic research on select agents will contribute to other areas of research, speed to the development of rapid detection techniques, etc.

Disagree, since this research is of immense potential value for our safety and security.

Disagree. All the areas of the biomedical research listed here overlap with the needs of biodefense research. There should not be extremes in finding. However, the Labs oriented towards biodefense should have the priority, for the sake of the mankind.

Disagree. All the rapid diagnostic technologies that are currently being funded by HSARPA and DARPA can be (will be) applied to the point-of-care medical diagnostics in the near future.

Disagree. Although Biodefense research shifts the focus to different organisms basic research is still being done.

Disagree. Basic research in biodefense deals with organisms, infections, methodologies, vaccine development, etc. that are important on their own merit, regardless of their possible role as biological agents.

Disagree. Biodefense funding is largely increased funding that would not have otherwise been part of the NIH/DOD budgets, and much of the biodefense work has broad application to multiple organisms, including those for which multi-drug resistance is an increasingly acute problem.

Disagree. Biodefense is an integral part of our present and future lives. Biodefense research is an integral part of understanding human disease, human development, biological effects of the environment, and mental disease.

Disagree. Biodefense research has historically been under funded. This underfunding has been primarily the result of the highly contagious nature of most of the pathogens designated as bioterrorism or biowarfare agents. However, these are historically important pathogens that have caused untold death and disease for humans. The current lull in human disease for things like plague, anthrax and Ebola virus does not make them any less worth studying. In fact given their potential it makes it more important to study these pathogens (and others) before there is a significant human heath issue. These pathogens (and others) are often great paradigm organisms for studying topics with wide applicability to other organisms including type three secretion systems (plague), iron acquisition and regulation, A-B toxins and sporulation (Anthrax) and hemorrhagic virus pathogenesis (Marburg/Ebola). Some argue these areas are best studied in less pathogenic relatives or attenuated organisms. I would posit that the frank pathogens are the best organisms to study to truly understand these pathogenic mechanisms and to develop and test medical countermeasures.

Disagree. Even if occasion for using products of biodefense research would not ever be erased, the research in the area of infectious diseases and responses of human organisms would provide very important information, e.g. antibiotic resistance.

Disagree. First, biodefense funding is additional money added to the research budget that was not there before. Secondly, these highly virulent pathogens represent extremely interesting biological systems that will provide important basic insight about general principles of pathogenesis and protection against human disease threats.

Disagree. Good research benefits all.

Disagree. Infectious diseases are a major cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide (e.g. TB, AIDS, malaria, etc.) Studying the pathogenesis of biodefense agents will add to our basic understanding of viral, bacterial and parasitic infections, and therapeutics developed for biodefense agents may have broader applicability. Also, some of the designated biodefense agents (e.g. Burkholderia) are endemic in other parts of the world and cause serious disease for which better treatments are urgently needed.

Disagree. It is helping us understand the pathogenic determinants of human pathogens.

Disagree. It would be foolish not to invest wisely in biodefense research; the alternative is to be plagued by agents with which we know nothing about/and thereby lead to extensive human casualties.

Disagree. It's another avenue of funding to be pursued by the biomedical research community.

Disagree. Just as emphasis on building nuclear devices at the end of WWII and the Cold War was a boon to physics and other traditional sciences, I believe that the current emphasis on infectious disease research will carry over to more research in public health concerns worldwide such as TB, malaria, HIV and influenza. Understanding the natural history of many of these pathogens will also bring to light ecological concepts highlighting an increased awareness in environmental sciences.

Disagree. Like the space program of the 60's and 70's, the follow-through technology and applications of such research hold great promise into the mitigation of human disease in the future. Take, for example, research into currently defined "biodefense" bacterial strains - many of these possess the same intractable features of current non-defense strains (eg. MDR, gram-positive vs. gram negative behavior, evasion mechanisms, biofilm formation, etc.), and solution of such issues in a biodefense-supported pathogen will necessarily have cross-over to non-defense-defined strains currently affecting human health worldwide. As an example of this, it is clear that TB is one of the world's most widely prevalent pathogens in a non-defense setting, and focusing dollars towards this disease (whether it be private funding ala the Gates Foundation, or, in a hypothetical case, biodefense dollars) clearly goes beyond the limited implied focus of the provided statement, rendering especially the first bullet point moot. Given also that many bacterial pathogens are environmentally persistent (cf. Anthracis), the third bullet point is also mooted through biodefense funding of such work on these pathogens.

Disagree. Provides funding for basic research on infectious agents, which is needed. Much of this knowledge would provide increased understanding of a variety of infectious diseases.

Disagree. Since the key components of our approach to biodefense detection will be performed in-silicio, all techniques and new software technologies that are developed will be directly applicable to and break new ground for biomedical research.

Disagree. Such funding is pushing advances in areas like aerosol collection, detectors and dangerous organisms that were underfunded previously.

Disagree. The biodefense research addresses the same issues that the mentioned research is trying to conduct. It is just a question of priorities. All the diseases that biodefense is addressing is also a priority for every other research areas. The technology developed by biodefense research will be helpful to all disease research areas. The biggest issue is how the biodefense research funding is given. The current system of awarding the grants to large known companies is misplaced. It slows innovation provided by small companies. The model used by awarding the contracts to large companies over the last four years has failed, as there is no significant progress in the technology and lot of waste of money. If the money was spent wisely, we could have made significant progress in newer technology. All the technologies currently developed by spending lots of money is just redressing the old technologies that are marketed by large companies. The methods are rapid but not necessarily smarter.

Disagree. The idea is too ridiculous to contemplate, especially considering all the money wasted in stupid wars.

Disagree. There is some wasted funding, probably more than in other areas, but the peer review process still works and it is important to target funds into an area to stimulate researchers to enter the field.

Disagree. This research is important given the ease with which anybody who is determined can bioengineer a toxic pathogen. However, there are numerous government agencies who are all participating in this type of research and many of their functions and directions overlap. The redundancy and lack of focus all waste precious resources. Perhaps a coordinated approach modeled on the National Nanotechnology Initiative would be more appropriate.

Disagree. Understanding how these agents cause disease and how the host responds can also be applied to many of the areas listed above.

DISAGREE. While more funding are needed to make fast progress in these areas, Biodefense research may aid many of these objectives (as Space Research aided many basic science area in the '60-'70s).

Disagree: Biodefense money is extra and the rest remains unchanged.

Disagree-it really supplements support for diagnosis, prevention and detection of infectious diseases, as well as drug/vaccine development. It will provide us with more information about the human response to infections that may possibly lead to *generic* treatments for all infections diseases. It will further enhance our ability to detect and monitor environmental contaminants at very low levels, in real time, a capability now generally lacking.

Do not agree. However, $ should be spent wisely on smart research that has the potential to have a high impact. Biodefense is an important endeavor, but not at the expense of diseases that kill millions per year.

False, if nothing else it has begun to revitalize the basic science of pathogens.

Good science research can apply to all areas of investigation, that is if the research is good science. When good scientists run off direction pursuing grant funding, the results can be disappointing.

I disagree because biodefense research can teach us about systems which relate to other human diseases, growth and development. Secondly, there are ways that biodefense can help us understand environmental microorganisms and other physical disorders.

Infectious diseases are becoming increasing identified as the causes of many of the disease and disorders that plaque society.

I disagree because biodefense research funds all of the above topics. For example, the Army is the biggest funder of breast cancer research.

I disagree because much of the money spent on biodefense will also add to the information base of many other disciplines.

I disagree because what we learn from our research has potential applications in all the other research areas described above.

I disagree for the most part. Overall, most research programs address fundamental biological questions pertinent to infectious disease.

I disagree from the standpoint that research in biodefense will lead to discoveries and platforms that can be applied to many infectious diseases. Also, by learning more about the host responses to these various diseases, we are learning more about the human immune system, which likely plays a part in some aspects of disease in each of the categories listed above.

I disagree it is a boondoggle; in many ways funding needs to stabilize so that a more long-term sustainable effort can be made on biodefense priorities. There is too much up-front investment in labs and people to conduct this kind of research to do it any other way; we cannot turn this kind of work on and off like a spigot, despite what bureaucrats might believe and desire. However, I do think that coordination of biodefense efforts funded by the US government is very important and has been lacking.

I disagree since it is part of the current issues which affect human health that needs to be addressed.

I disagree since these and other areas stand to benefit from biodefense research, similar to the technology that had been generated by the space program.

I disagree with the first view. Biodefense research funding is important for research fields of causes, diagnosis, prognosis, prevention and cure of human infectious diseases, if the funding properly works. I partially agree with 2nd and later views. However, we are currently facing significant risks to exposure serious infectious diseases not only by bioterrorism but also by nature. And I think that we need to spend our efforts for biodefense research, although our research are also important for our life.

I disagree with the inference that biodefense research has no cross-functional benefit to the other areas listed. Development of materials, instrumentation and techniques during biodefense activities, though perhaps not the most efficient route of discovery, is a parallel route to relieving the suffering from all the other listed areas. These improvements do make it to the rest of the scientific community for everyone’s benefit.

I disagree with the statement mostly because the majority of biodefense research is the same research that was being worked on previously. We just changed the titles on our grant applications to include the sexy "Biodefense" buzz word.............

I disagree with this statement because if Biodefense research is conducted and funded appropriately and undergoes peer-review most if not all areas of biomedical research can benefit from results. The goal in funding and research should be to move forward not laterally.

I disagree with this statement due to the fact that the research that is taking place for Biodefense is readily applied to these common diseases that affect humanity world wide. The research that is taking place in biodefense is very easily applied to most of the critical biomedical research areas, and with cooperation from funding agencies, cooperative grants could be applied to a combination of any one of the biomedical research areas with the biodefense research that is ongoing.

I disagree with this statement. As a scientist that works in these other areas, I see that there may be a natural synergy between the two, and the findings in one area can be applied to others. For example, in studying influenza, it has been shown that survivors of the 1918 pandemic flu suffered from long termed motor defects linked to Parkinson’s disease as well as Von Economo's disease. Learning how this happens can also provide clues to the etiology of these diseases outside of the viral environment. However, it is up to the NIH and other government agencies to facilitate these synergies.

I disagree with this statement. Biodefense research would be able to add to each of the listed biomedical problems as the very sensitive assays developed for biodefense can then be modified for other uses. It has happened in the past and will continue to happen.

I disagree with this statement. Prior to the extreme emphasis on biodefense and concern over agents of biological warfare, little funding was provided for research focusing on infectious diseases in the U.S. Chronic diseases have certainly been the major concern for the majority of Americans. However, a lack of research on the infectious diseases that are still threats, though thankfully at a smaller scale, leaves us vulnerable to them should they ever escalate in their prevalence and/or pathogenicity.

I disagree with this statement. The USA is constantly under threat from various sources and bioterrorism is a huge threat which if implemented would lead to loss of several lives. Hence it is essential to identify potential therapeutic agents for several dangerous pathogens such as Ebola and Marburg which cause deadly diseases.

I disagree, because as in the case of the space program, there are many advances in treating routine and emerging diseases that grow from programs such as biodefense.

I disagree, I think with the current threat of terrorism around the world that biological weapons could be used in the near future. If we don't stay ahead of the terrorists, we could be in grave danger.

I disagree. All areas of research are generally funded and biodefense funding draws from separate areas of funding that would not normally impact other research.

I disagree. As with much research on subjects like cancer prevention and HIV treatment, any new discoveries that come out of biodefense can be easily helpful to other fields. A biosensor designed for detection of dangerous targets is very similar to a biosensor for detection of other targets important for biomedical applications.

I disagree. Basic research often studies diseases that affect some people, or those who are at risk for developing the disease. Biodefense research studies diseases that affect all of us, because we are all at risk. In addition, lessons learned from this type of work supports preventative and curative treatments for patients in times of peace.

I disagree. Biodefense research has returned respectability to the field of microbiology, especially bacteriology. It was not very many years ago that departments were dropping the name "Microbiology" in favor of the sexier names like "molecular genetics" or "gene therapy". There was a wrongly placed perception that bacterial infections were a passing annoyance which could be easily dealt with using antibiotics. With the occurrences of 2001 and the renewed emphasis on biodefense, microbiology is back. A professor once asked me why I wanted to work on bacterial pathogenesis, as it was a dead field; he now has two NIH grants on anthrax. The problem with biodefense funding is the same problem as with AIDS funding in the late 80's and early 90's; the government throws a lot of money at the problem, and some bad research proposals get funded reducing the overall funding for everybody else. Once we are past the initial wave of enthusiasm, the cycle settles down to some normalcy. Avian flu may be the next money pit for government funding. The real problem with funding is other distractions like the war in Iraq that are taxing the overall budget. If you look at the NIH budget, it has basically stayed flat for several years, but the large biodefense grants that were granted 3 and 4 years ago still have a year or two left on their committed funding. Once we are past these commitments, things should get a bit better, but until we get done with the mess overseas, funding will remain tight for the foreseeable future.

I disagree. Biodefense research is in itself important and needs funding in order to ensure that we are prepared not only for the potential attack but also for the natural outbreaks. Therefore, it should get funded even if general budget does not increase and funding has to be taken from other area.

I disagree. Biodefense research is very important and not only includes terrorist agents, but also reemerging and emerging infectious diseases.

I disagree. Biodefense research, like any other, will lead to novel diagnostic, analytical and therapeutic reagents and/or pathways that will be of value across the biomedical field.

I disagree. In my opinion, NIH has only reallocated the funding based on current needs. Given marginal increases in funding within all NIH Institutes, there is a need for each Institute to focus spending federal $$ on translational research that will have immediate impact. All the four areas mentioned above are important but need to be evaluated based on their near term impact to the public.

I disagree. Like many scientific endeavors that are in effect military or defense in nature the basic discoveries made in the research being done in these areas will be rapidly find use in the endeavors that they appear upon the surface to be short changing. The investments we make in this area will reap rewards that are unrelated to defense and will serve to advance the science in any number of related areas.

I disagree. The knowledge gained from basic research is inherently neutral. I believe that the application of this knowledge, and future translational research, may be initially applied to the stated goal (biodefense applications), but will ultimately have greater applications to solving multiple problems. The challenge is one of dissemination of basic biodefense research so that researchers in other disciplines may gain from discoveries.

I disagree. The potential consequences of a well implemented bioweapon are staggering to the imagination, and might easily outweigh the consequences of all current diseases combined. So far we have been lucky that terrorists have been lousy scientists and good scientists have been decent humans. Biodefense funding needs to be allocated efficiently so as not to severely impact standard areas of scientific research. Also, technology developed for biodefense is likely to be applicable for other biomedical research and treatment purposes as well.

I disagree. Though the probability of a major biological attack in any given location is relatively low, the impact of such an attack, should one occur, would be devastating, not only in terms of human health, but also economically and psychologically. Preparedness for such an event, no matter how seemingly unlikely, is crucial. In addition, much of the research being conducted initially for biodefense purposes will prove to be beneficial in other areas.

I do not agree because growing in biodefense research and discoveries we will grow also on those issues.

I do not agree since research in biodefense will have indirect effect on diagnosis, prevention and cure for human diseases.

I do not agree with this statement, as it does not take into account today's world situation. We are in a country that is at war and we need to be prepared to defense ourselves against any treat. It is known that other country have bioweapons and they might use them against us.

I do not agree. Biodefense research is equally important as the other areas are. All the areas of research should be given equal importance.

I don't agree with the above statement because lots of the infectious diseases sponsored by Biodefense research funding are becoming very serious and increasing recently, especially those coupled with drug resistance.

I don't agree with the statement as it is written, but I do not know how strong a word "boondoggle" is. Excessive focus on biodefense funding could potentially be exploited to the detriment of funding of other disease which are more serious and immediate concern.

I don't agree. Most areas of research have direct applicability to civilian and public health problems. People that think this are just sore after their grant didn't get funded...

I don't see any one of these fields as taking away from the other. All listed are important, and absence of either would compromise future human health.

I strongly disagree in the strongest terms. This research will accelerate to fundamental advances, not only in biodefense, but also in other areas of microbial pathogenesis and emerging diseases.

I strongly disagree with the statement. I think that biodefense research funding has changed the view on clinical as well as basic research in common none biodefense research facilities to in a joint venture solve specific problems in our World - I believe that funding this way actually has increased if one takes advantage. Furthermore, it has put several pathogens in the scoop of basic research that only few would have found interesting to research - with the view of understanding causes, prevention and cure of the specific diseases. However, this does not mean that we as the research community and funding sources should forget other areas of research not presently on the list of biodefense research.

I strongly disagree. Any attendee of the ASM Biodefense conference realizes that the several of the same scientific players pre-2001 are picking up biodefense funding for their labs. The first 5 minutes of an individual's talk argue why the ongoing research has a biodefense importance, then they talk about the same research that they have always done, maybe with a new twist. For instance, epidemiologic study of a non-biodefense pathogen can have implications for nearest neighbor pathogens and visa versa. An overall increase in funding has helped several projects without a direct relation to the biodefense field.

I strongly disagree. Heavy biodefense funding helps every area of biomedical research. Allocation of substantial funding is beneficial even if it is targeted to the study of few model biodefense pathogens because the discoveries can be adapted to a multitude of other different organisms.

I think that biodefense funding is providing support for under-represented diseases and the novel tools and technology developed in this field often has applications in other areas of biomedical research.

I totally disagree, as we will face more and more new biological agent that are threat to public health. Biodefense research besides giving solution to prevent any bioterrorism threat is important for a better knowledge on infectious disease.

I totally disagree. While bioterrorist attacks have been extremely limited and uncommon, this is certainly an area that will be exploited in the future. We MUST remain pro-active in biodefense research, so that the necessary infrastructure and research knowledge is in place PRIOR to such attacks. If we allow this area to languish, we WILL be sorry in the long run when attacks do occur. The NIH should be commended as well for recognizing that attacks from Category B and C pathogens are real possibilities (such as the Rajneeshi attack in 1984) that could cause huge social and economic upheaval.

In disagreement with the above statement, biodefense research is a necessary field of upcoming research. However spending on biodefense related research has diverted spending on research which could lead to important findings to prevent existing worldwide epidemic-like diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis. A majority of the nations also still suffer from diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and leprosy. Due to the heightened attention to biodefense post 9/11 and anthrax threats, there has been reduced attention to other "real" diseases.

It helps worldwide epidemic viruses from spreading and infecting thousands of people.
It is not a boondoggle. Much of what is learned from different pathogens may have relevance to other human pathogens. Also, specific virulence molecules of pathogens may be applicable for treating human diseases and minimizing general inflammatory responses.

It’s very important for our future and in the process of always making new medicine to fight of Problems and Diseases!

Keeping in view of today's technology & pressures from terrors. I think, it is imperative, that we put in all our efforts on biodefense research!

Most of the science as applied to biodefense is the same as science that is not directly related to biodefense. Biodefense is just a subset of viruses, bacteria, and toxins that is otherwise studied and most of the directed research can be applied to other fields, especially in the fields of therapeutics, drug delivery, diagnosis, etc.

Mostly disagree, but there are a lot of biodefense dollars that are not being used for solving real world problems.

Necessary area for development and could/should be complementary to biomedical research in its approach to understanding the pathogenesis of disease.

No - as long as the money is used in the contest of a broader program to study infectious disease.

No Biodefense research is an appropriate, preemptive agenda in order to support R&D necessary for national security.

No, because biodefense research will lead to widely applicable discoveries for human health in general.

No, Biodefense should be top priority and is critical not only to our national security but also makes significant contribution to understanding a disease process.
No, extension of other infectious disease science.

No, I do not agree. As long as Biodefense research is conducted intelligently, understanding of infectious human diseases, both existing and emerging diseases will be increased, not decreased. One of the most important things to keep in mind is that many pathogens can potentially become bioterrorism agents. Focusing to specifically on a small class of the most spectacular agents seems to be a recipe for disaster.

No, I do not agree. The advances that are taking place will put into effect measures that will be necessary to deal with a potential biological attack. Even if that doesn't occur, the advances will be important for dealing with emerging infectious diseases, and more importantly, drug resistance. Those problems will not be solved for many years to come and will continue to be major health issues. I view these advances as similar to the ones that have taken place in the sometimes criticized space program. Developments came out of that program that have been useful in many areas of our lives. I feel the same will be true with the Biodefense program, particularly with infectious diseases.

No, I do not believe that. We initiated research on filoviruses in our lab with an R21. However, since that expired, we have found it increasingly tough to continue research and are only able to do so because I as a postdoc work currently on two projects. We have excellent data supporting mechanisms of pathogenesis but need funding to continue to do research to fortify our current data of pathogenesis.

No, I think biodefense is a very important issue that we need to pay attention to.

No, more needs to be spent, just wisely. Giving money to anyone who asked hasn't cured cancer. Let's be wise about this.

No, the biodefense initiative is necessary to highlight specific pathogens that would otherwise be neglected or under funded (such as Yersinia)

No. Although I do think that the research undertaken should have a basic, mechanistic approach instead of a "quick and dirty" let's see what we can do, approach. Long-term versus short fill-in.

No. Biodefense research can actually make positive contributions to the development of all these research areas mentioned above.

No. It is important to be prepared.

No. Just like with the NASA space program, many new discoveries are being made that help out other areas of research that come from biodefense funding. I once had a competitor that was receiving AIDS funding to support his studies on calmodulin. While that seems completely unrelated, the research helped unravel mysteries about cell division that now help HIV research and cell biology in general.

Not true. Biodefense research budget mostly comes from Homeland defense and would not only have minor effect on other research funding but would instead be used for regular fundamental research that if there was no such situation would not be funded.

Not true. It is very important to study all aspects of a particular bacterium or virus anyway.

Research is science, and by default knowledge. Any knowledge that we gain from research (whether biodefense or not) could be applied to multiple other fields. Often, "extraneous" research funded by the NIH or some such, has led to insights that have directly impacted the above mentioned fields. Drained resources are not the problem- lack of critical interpretation and application of new knowledge is the real boondoggle. For example, the information that led Nobel laureates to believe that ulcers were caused by bacteria, not stress, was in the literature for decades, but no one critically applied these scattered pieces of data until the late 1980's. Think of how quality of life could have been improved for many ulcer patients if only these puzzle pieces were assembled earlier!
Resources earmarked for biodefense should directly interface with current ongoing needs and research to maximize its impact and not drain progress in other important areas.
Strongly disagree. Identification of therapeutic targets requires a reliable animal model of infection or intoxication. Development of such animal models, a priori, provides the series of defined linear events of pathogenesis associated with the pathogen or toxin. As a requirement for development of therapeutics this IS basic research that must be conducted either with or without a biodefense label.

There are many common features of biodefense agents and medical issues resulting from natural exposure. The same type of argument was used against NASA spending in the race to the moon, and there have been multiple new technologies that came out of that federally-funded effort.

This research is just as important as any research on infectious diseases. All disease research is based on some likelihood of exposure. Based on the factor that there are definitely people out there who wish Americans harm it is only logical to spend money trying to protect Americans. It is worth remembering the old saying "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure". The spending of this money may prevent the millions required to treat people if we are attacked by biological or chemical weapons.
When we all agree with the adage 'Prevention is better than cure' - why does a part of the research community have a problem with increased funding for bio"defense" research at this crucial juncture. If the government did not take a proactive approach and neglected funding for biodefense, when a terrorism strike or natural infection epidemic occurs, the same community is going to blame the government for not being prepared. Prioritizing is a balancing act and any management (government or non-governmental) is going to have a tough time pleasing everybody. At this time in history, it is necessary not only to focus on existing human disease but also increase efforts to prevent new ones from emerging. There might be some valuable lessons to be learnt from biodefense research that can be applied in other areas. The recent evidence of LCMV infection preventing type I diabetes in animal models is one such example.

As an immunologist focusing on 'biological' control of infectious diseases, we have worked in biological defense for years. Current nomenclature may change from 'host response' to 'biodefense' to satisfy some ivory towers, and maybe it incorporates a community view, but the research hasn't change one iota.

Biodefense research in inherently a waste of precious resources in an ideal world - with no wars, terrorism, religious fundamentalism and intolerance, hegemonistic attitudes, and dogma of all kinds. However, we live in a far from ideal world and, like it or not, have to reap the consequences of the actions of a few. If bioterror is a weapon in such a world then it would be prudent, nay, necessary, to be prepared with counter-measures against attack. To that extent, budgeting for biodefense research is understandable. However, while peace can be visualized in only one way, war and destruction can be brought about in numerous different ways (conventional warfare, biological warfare, chemical warfare, nuclear warfare, economic warfare, etc.). How do we budget for every possible way? Are we better off spending the money (and they are huge sums of money) on primary health-care, education, protection of the environment, etc.? This is a difficult question to answer in a given situation, and is easier to answer in a philosophical sense. On the other hand, wars bring about innovations that may never be seen in times of peace, perhaps because of the heightened sense of urgency during wars. For instance, if greater insights are obtained into basic human and pathogen biology in the current war, the expense might be worth it, for ultimately, it is basic research that it going to fuel decades of applied research.

Biodefense research is a very important topic considering the tragic events around the world lately. At the same time it should not take away funds from critical biomedical research. NIH and/or federal government should supplement rather than divert funds from biomedical research. If the funds are diverted it is going to affect critical biomedical which in turn affect drug discovery etc.

Biodefense research is about human diseases. Five of six of the level one agents produce death by systemic inflammation syndrome (sepsis). New therapies for this common route to death are desperately needed, and funding radical approaches is more feasible because of biodefense research.

Biodefense research is important and government should increase the funding which will not affect the source of other medical research.

Biodefense research needs to be targeted and prioritized. It needs to be inclusive to entrepreneurial types and industry types and go beyond supporting academic research. Discoveries are made by innovative thinking and experiments directed to applied and very commercial areas. We need to be cognizant that our enemies use very practical and simple means to run around what we do. I would like to see some practical biochemical engineering that draws in key sciences, coupled to genomic identification work, that leads to development and applications in diagnostics and treatments.

Biodefense research priorities as they currently are reflected in funding decisions are symptomatic of a program without a plan, much like the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative - just another way for old generals (researchers) to find a way to win the last war. Unless broad-spectrum generic applicability results from such research, the next "new" agent destroys all. Today's scientists need to decide: are you first and foremost building your career or are you first and foremost contributing to the greater good?

Boondoggle statement is too severe. That the effort is overblown for political purposes is correct. The areas of research essential to detection of Biowarfare agents, in and of itself, makes sense. However, most of the fundamental knowledge needed to address problems associated with existing or developed biowarfare agents could be obtained through the kinds of fundamental research areas already in place prior to the politicization of the Biodefense arena.

Frankly, I do not see that competition for FEDERAL (i.e. NIH) biodefense research is any different from other research; it is just as difficult to obtain and appears to be fairly vetted. I do feel, however, that the funding streams controlled by the DoD and DHS is carefully controlled by those agencies.


I believe the term "Biodefense" is sometimes used as a mantra and can have a deleterious effect on both public attitudes and dollars towards research. Since the term lacks a clear definition it is easy to manipulate in the hands of politicians or companies looking to capitalize. The reality is many more of us will have our lives touched more closely by human disease and by environmental concerns. While it is shortsighted to ignore the threat of bio terrorism, it is more so to focus upon it at the detriment of unmet medical need.

I feel neutral to the statement because in some ways the money spent is being taken away from other important biomedical fields as mentioned above. In other ways, the biodefense research is an area that still needs to be addressed, while some of the research may even overlap with other biomedical fields.

It is important to conduct research leading to detection, treatment, and vaccine development for pathogens that could easily and feasibly be used in a bioterror attack. However, many pathogens on the government's list, and to which the government is targeting many research $$ that could otherwise be spent on conditions currently affecting many people, could not easily be used in such an attack. Much more common sense is needed to apply to decisions on how biodefense dollars can be used most effectively. Currently, far too much money is being wasted.

It is important, but needs more ecological focus on local scale, not industrial scale, of Ford production and distribution. If transportation and storage becomes impaired, local Ford production is the best insurance and defense. Same holds for safe and dependable water supplies.

Neither agree nor disagree. It is a legitimate and important area of research in the public interest, but must be balanced with other health research needs. Achieving the right balance would prevent biodefense research from being EITHER a boondoggle OR an example of irresponsible negligence.

Spending for biodefense needs to be kept in perspective given that it is by far cheaper and easier for terrorists to plant road side IEDs, detonate car bombs, hijack airplanes, etc.
The biggest problem in creating a biodefense program is the unknown in that it is difficult to predict what agents will be developed an how they will be used. In anticipating the threat, many research programs may be initiated that are irrelevant in anticipation of terrorist activities.

The difficulty with the Biodefense structure is the minimal decision making structure for coordinating research programs, evaluating results, and funding new initiatives based on these results. The program was to be built on the NIH model of review and funding but the infrastructure to make this work takes time, training, and personnel. All critical areas of research are perennially under funded. It requires a thoughtful policy balance to appropriately dedicate funds to a field of endeavor when it will prove most effective. Many breakthroughs require a paradigm shift or a new discovery to yield a environment where much progress can be made by dedicating funds. The biodefense field is developing the ability to just know start initial wide spread investigation. At the end of the next 5 years, the field will begin to show a watershed of demonstrable results.
The major criticism of funding for biodefense research is that the dollars are going to diseases that affect very few people now (eg anthrax, tularemia) with the thought that the investment is justified if there is a future event and many people are affected then. To some extent there is similarity between the disconnect between the dollars being spent and persons currently affected as there is with orphan drug research or research on diseases affecting people outside the US but with little impact in the US. However, the real question is whether these funds would be redeployed to another area of the NIH if they were withdrawn from biodefense research, and in the current funding climate it is clear that they would be lost altogether. Were these funds taken from other unrelated areas of research and redeployed to biodefense research? That is not clear, but it is surely true that they would be lost if they were removed from biodefense topics now.
The most dangerous bioterrorist is mother nature with infinite research space and time in which to conduct experiments. The next plague is inevitable and with out the proper understanding of the specific pathogenesis mechanisms that will be utilized in the next world wide pandemic, the ability to counter such a broad range attack will be nonexistent. Therefore, the basic understanding of infectious diseases is critical to the ability to counter the attack when (not if) it comes.

The potential dark side of biodefense research is once the technology is developed it can be disastrous if it gets into the wrong hands. Since the U.S. trains not only U.S. scientist but also foreign scientists there is always a potential for our research to cross be used against us.

There is perhaps a lack of balance in funding which is not unusual in federal research funding in general. There will be advances in our understanding of many other areas of science through the Biodefense spending. What is unclear is whether there would be a better return on investment for more basic science and other non directed research.
To some extent, Biodefense research IS a boondoggle, in the same way that all targeted funding programs are. However, there are plentiful examples that illustrate how scientists adapt their research activities to capture these sorts of funding opportunities and use the support to generate data that are meaningful in the broader context of the life sciences. For example, targeted AIDS research programs have led to increased understanding of immunology, neuroscience, and even diabetes pathophysiology.

True that it diverts funds to some extent, but any basic research will advance all research ultimately.

While, in general, probably too much focus has been directed at biodefense research, these monies usually have been in addition to already funded areas of research. So they do not take away from other pots of monies. In addition, many areas of basic research have been expanded that would not normally have been pursued leading to some interesting research developments.

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